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ment, and consequently in the productivity of R&D. We show that
economies with more or less the same productivity of R&D integrate.
In equilibrium, there can be many common markets with different
growth rates as well as stagnating economies with decreasing relative
income. A small economy with low incentives to save can avoid stag-
nation, if its R&D is so productive that a common market with a
positive growth rate can accept it as a member.
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1 Introduction
It is known that different institutions are reflected in the different level of
productivity in the R&D sector. Many historically determined factors, e.g.
bad working practises, a low standard of legal institutions and a high rate of
criminality, decrease the productivity of R&D.1 The EU is going to take new
members which have weaker research environment than in the old members.
It is instructing to examine the consequences of this change.
In this study, we show that the expansion of a common market to
economies with lower productivity in R&D has two opposing effect on wel-
fare. New members increase welfare through a wider variety of products, but
on the other hand they decrease the average productivity in R&D in the
common market, which lowers R&D, the growth rate and welfare. When
these two effects are balanced, an optimal common market obtains.
In this study, we also examine how country-specific differences in the
productivity of R&D affect growth and economic integration. We give one
possible explanation for the following stylized facts:
• There has been a wide dispersion in cross-country growth rates.2
• Many countries have had a common long-term growth rate.3
• Some small countries have been able to grow much faster than others.4
• Some countries started to grow much faster after establishing a common
market with a greater economy.5
Common market studies have mainly concerned two aspects of integra-
tion: (i) free trade, and (ii) the equalization of the rates of return. Walz
(1998) shows that the integration of a third, technologically lagging economy
into a common market of two technologically advanced economies causes a
reallocation of resources which stimulates overall growth. According to Bald-
win and Forslid (2000), trade liberalization stimulates growth via increased
1See e.g. Barro (1998).
2See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
3See e.g. Howitt (2000), (2002).
4E.g. Ventura (1997) and the East Aasian Miracle.
5E.g. Ireland and Portugal after joining the EU.
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competition in the R&D and financial sectors. Peretto (2000) shows that
integration slows down growth via higher fixed costs for a greater variety
of goods, but speeds up growth via greater economies of scale. He argues
that the latter effect tends to dominate and growth and welfare will rise. In
contrast to these papers, we focus on a third aspect of economic integration,
the reallocation of research activity among the member economies. From
that viewpoint, common markets generate interesting development patterns.
For instance, an economy, which did not undertake R&D before, may start
doing so if it joins to a common market.
Howitt (2000) composes a model of creative destruction with interna-
tional technology spillover. He specifies institutional aspects that impinge
directly on the incentive to invest and innovate as shadow subsidies (or
taxes) and obtains following results. Economies with R&D converge to par-
allel growth paths with different productivity levels, but the other economies
stagnate. The world growth rate depends positively on R&D subsidy rate
in all economies. In Howitt (2000), the main reason for the convergence of
the national growth rates is that every economy with R&D gradually adopts
the same frontier technology. In this paper, we show that the growth rates
of all economies belonging to the same common market converge, although
the economy-specific levels of productivity in R&D were exogenously given.
Hence, no transfer of technology is needed to explain growth convergence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
institutional assumptions and section 3 the basic model. Section 4 considers
firms producing consumption and intermediate goods. Section 5 examines
households, who save by investing in R&D firms in the same common market.
Section 6 analyzes the effects of economic integration.
2 The setting
Each household supplies a fixed quantity of labour, which can be used either
in production or in R&D. Competitive firms assemble consumption goods
from intermediate products, and local monopolies make intermediate goods
from labour with constant returns to scale. R&D firms employ labour with
constant returns to scale and try to make a better version of any of the
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intermediate-goods. Technological change is random, of quality ladders type.
In the advent of success, a R&D firm drives the old local monopoly out of the
market and takes over the production of the intermediate good. R&D firms
finance their investment by issuing shares. The households save by investing
in these shares. The level of productivity in the consumption-good sector is
determined by R&D history.
There exists a great number J of economies. The salient feature of the
model is that the level of productivity λj in R&D is given and differs through-
out the economies j = 1, .., J . When λj is high (low), we say that research en-
vironment is good (bad) in economy j. Any set of economies, Γ ⊂ {1, ..., J},
can form a common market. The size of this market is given by
θ(Γ)
.
=
∫
k∈Γ
dk ≤ J. (1)
The average productivity of R&D in common market Γ is defined by
λ(Γ)
.
=
1
θ(Γ)
∫
k∈Γ
λkdk. (2)
To focus on the effect of economic institutions, we make the following as-
sumptions. There is no migration between economies. Intermediate goods
are traded within the same common market, but not elsewhere. Firms can
do R&D everywhere in the same common market. Households can invest in
R&D firms operating in the same economy. Without these assumptions, the
mathematical model would be excessively complicated.
In this setting, economic integration – i.e. the expansion of a common
market – has two effects. New members increase welfare through a wider
variety of products. On the other hand, if they have a lower productivity of
R&D or a lower savings rate than the old members of the common market,
technological change will be slower and the level of welfare lower for the old
members. When these advantages and disadvantages of economic integration
are balanced, the common market is of optimal size.
3 The model
Given the setting above, we now specify technology and preferences.
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(i) Producers. In each economy j, there is at a time one firm which produces
intermediate good j from local labour. A large number of firms produces the
consumption good from all intermediate goods k made in the same common
market Γ through Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale,
C = µ(θ(Γ))
∏
k∈Γ
(Bkxk)
1/θ(Γ), µ′ > 0, (3)
where C is consumption in common market Γ, xk the demand for interme-
diate input k, Bk the productivity of input k and θ(Γ) the size of Γ. The
function µ(θ) with µ′ > 0 characterizes the property that a wider variety of
products (i.e. a bigger θ) yields more services to the households and thereby
increases welfare.6 This is the main motivation of economic integration.
(ii) R&D firms. The R&D firms located in economy j ∈ Γ attempt to
improve intermediate good j. They employ labour everywhere in the same
common market Γ and finance their expenditure wholly by issuing shares.
Technological change in economy j is characterized by a Poisson process qj
as follows. The arrival rate of innovations in the R&D process is given by
Λj =
∫
k∈Γ
λkzjkdk, (4)
where zjk is the demand for labour in economy k by R&D firms located in
economy j, and λk the (exogenously given) productivity of R&D in economy
k. During a short time interval dt, there is an innovation dqj = 1 with
probability Λjdt, and no innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1− Λjdt.
Because labour inputs zjk are prefect substitutes in the production func-
tion (4), R&D firms employ labour in the economy k ∈ Γ with lowest unit
cost wk/λk. In equilibrium, wj/λj is then uniform for j ∈ Γ,
wj = λjw for j ∈ Γ, (5)
where w is the wage per effective labour in R&D in common market Γ.
(iii) Technological change. We denote the serial number of technology in
economy k by tk. The level of productivity in the production of intermediate
6In other papers, the property that product variety increases welfare is commonly
established through a CES production function. In this study, the replacement of the
Cobb-Douglas function (3) by a CES function would excessively complicate the analysis.
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good k, Bk(tk), is determined by the currently most advanced technology
tk. The invention of a new technology raises tk by one and the level of
productivity Bk(tk) by ε > 1. This implies
Bk(tk) = Bk(0)ε
tk . (6)
Because the average growth rates are in fixed proportion (log ε) to the arrival
rates Λk,
7 we can use Λk as proxies of the growth rates of economies. From
the production function (3) it follows that in common market Γ the level of
productivity in the consumption-good sector is given by
B
.
=
∏
k∈Γ
Bk(tk)
1/θ(Γ), (7)
and the average growth rate of consumption (= the arrival rate of jumps
ε > 1 in the level of productivity in the consumption-good sector) by
Λ
.
=
1
θ(Γ)
∫
k∈Γ
Λkdk. (8)
Hence, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 The members of a common market Γ have parallel consump-
tion growth paths. They may have different levels of productivity, but their
consumption grows at the same rate (8).
In contrast to Howitt (2000), where growth convergence results from interna-
tional technology spillover, the unification of the growth rates is here caused
by free movement of R&D firms in the common market.
(iv) Households. There is a fixed number κj of households in economy j.
These avert risk and maximize utility over an infinite horizon, given random
technological change. We define the utility of household ι ∈ {1, ..., κj} in
economy j from an infinite stream of consumption beginning at time T as:
Uj(Cjι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
C1−βjι − 1
1− β e
−ρj(τ−T )dτ, ρj > 0, β < 1, (9)
where τ is time, E the expectations operator, Cjι consumption by household
ι, ρj the constant rate of time preference and β the constant degree of relative
risk aversion.
7For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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We denote household ι’s investment in R&D (= ι’s saving) in economy j
by Sjι. In economy j, aggregate investment by households,
∫
ι
Sjιdι, is equal
to the issue of shares by R&D firms, which in turn is equal to aggregate
investment
∫
k∈Γwkzjkdk. Given (4) and (5), this condition takes the form∫
ι
Sjιdι =
∫
k∈Γ
wkzjkdk = w
∫
k∈Γ
λkzjkdk = wΛj. (10)
When a household has financed a successful R&D project, it acquires
a certain share of the profit the successful firm earns. We assume that it
receives a share of the firm’s profit which is equal to its investment relative
to total investment made in the same successful project. A successful project
also implies that the old firm is driven out of the market. In such a case, all
shares held by a household in the old firm lose their value.
Let ijι be household ι’s true share of the profits in economy j when the
uncertainty of the outcome of the projects is taken into account. Then,∫ κj
ι=1
ijιdj = 1 (11)
must be true. Following Wa¨lde (1999a), we assume that the change in the
true profit share, dijι, is a function of the increment dqj of a Poisson process
qj and the investment share Ijι of household ι out of total investment (10):
dijι = (Ijι − ijι)dq for all j and ι, where Ijι = Sjι∫
ι∈Γ Sjιdk
=
Sjι
wΛj
. (12)
When a household does not invest at all in the upcoming vintage (i.e. Ijι =
0), its share-holdings are reduced to zero (i.e. dijι = −ijι) in the case of
R&D success dq = 1. If it invests in the upcoming vintage, then the size of
the share-holdings depends on relative investment Ijι.
4 Production
The representative consumption-good firm in common market Γ maximizes
its profit Π
.
= PC − ∫
k∈Γ pkxkdk by inputs xk, k ∈ Γ, subject to technology
(3), given the input prices pk, k ∈ Γ, and the output price P . This yields
pk = P
∂C
∂xk
=
PC
θ(Γ)xk
for k ∈ Γ. (13)
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Each new generation of any intermediate good provides exactly ε > 1
times as many services as the product of the generation before it. All poten-
tial producers of intermediate good k take part in Bertrand competition and
can produce one unit of their product from one labour unit. They maximize
their profit pik
.
= pkxk − wkxk by their output xk, given the wage in k ∈ Γ,
wk. One firm only has access to the technology for a state-of-art product,
while another is able to manufacture the product that is one step behind on
the quality ladder. To keep entrants away from the market, the incumbent
firm sets its output price pk equal to εwk, which yields
8
pk = εwk, pik
.
= pkxk − wkxk = (1− 1/ε)pkxk. (14)
Because there is no trade nor investment between the common markets,
the price levels in these are totally independent. Hence, we can choose a sep-
arate numeraire for each common market Γ and normalize total consumption
expenditure PC at θ(Γ). Given PC = θ(Γ), (13) and (14), we obtain
pkxk = 1, pik = 1− 1/ε, wk = pk/ε = 1/(εxk). (15)
Labour devoted to R&D in economy k is defined by
zk
.
=
∫
j∈Γ
zjkdj. (16)
We assume that in economy k each of the κj households supplies 1/κj units
of labour. Because there is no migration, R&D firms employ zk units and
the intermediate-good firm xk units of labour, the equilibrium condition of
the labour market in economy k is then given by
1 = xk + zk for all k. (17)
Given (2), (8), (15), (16) and (17), we obtain
λk/λj = wk/wj = xj/xk for j, k ∈ Γ, λjxj = λkxk for j, k ∈ Γ,
Λ
.
=
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
Λkdk =
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
λkzkdk =
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
λk(1− xk)dk = λ− λjxj, (18)
which yield
xj =
λ− Λ
λj
, w =
wj
λj
=
1
ελjxj
=
1
ε
1
λ− Λ for j ∈ Γ, λ > Λ. (19)
8Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 4.
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5 Consumption and investment
Household ι ∈ {1, ..., κj} in economy j supplies 1/κj units of labour, and
receives the wage wj and the share ijι of the total profit of the intermediate-
good firm, pij.
9 Given (5) and (15), its total income is then
Ajι =
wj
κj
+ ijιpij =
wj
κj
+
(
1− 1
ε
)
ijι = λj
w
κj
+
(
1− 1
ε
)
ijι. (20)
Because income Ajι is equal to savings Sjι plus consumption expenditure
PCjι, consumption Cjι is determined by
Cjι =
Ajι − Sjι
P
=
1
P
[
λj
w
κj
+
(
1− 1
ε
)
ijι
]
− Sjι
P
. (21)
Household ι maximizes its utility (9) subject to stochastic process (12)
and the budget constraint (21) by its saving Sjι, taking the wages wj and
w, the consumption price P and the arrival rate of innovations Λj as given.
We denote the value of receiving a share ijι of the profit of the producers
possessing current technology tj by Ω(ijι, tj), and the value of receiving a
share Ij of the profit of the producers discovering the next technology tj + 1
by Ω(Ij, tj + 1). The Bellman equation for the household’s program is then
10
ρjΩ(ijι, tj) = max
Sjι≥0
{
C1−βjι /(1− β) + Λj[Ω(Ijι, tj + 1)− Ω(ijι, tj)]
}
, (22)
where Cjι is given by (21). This leads to the first-order condition
Λj
∂
∂Sjι
[Ω(Ijι, tj + 1)− Ω(ijι, tj)] = −C−βjι
∂Cjι
∂Sjι
= C−βjι /P. (23)
We focus entirely on the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the
allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, and ignore dynamics
during the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. We try the
solution that consumption expenditure PCjι is a share 0 ≤ cjι ≤ 1 of income
Ajι, and that the value function is
Ω = (cjιAjι)
1−β/[(1− β)rjι], (24)
9Because the consumption-good firms are subject to constant returns to scale, in equi-
librium they do not yield profits.
10Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Wa¨lde (1999a), (1999b).
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where the expenditure-income ratio cjι and the household’s subjective inter-
est rate rjι are independent of income Ajι. Inserting these solutions into (22)
and (23), we obtain that in common market Γ the subjective interest rates
rjι and the expenditure-income ratios cjι are uniform (Appendix A):
rjι = rj
.
= ρj + [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λj > 0 for all j ∈ Γ, (25)
1− Sjι
Ajι
= cjι = cj
.
= min
{
1,
ρj + [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λj
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)(ε/θ)1−β
}
for all j ∈ Γ.
(26)
Now we can show the following:
Proposition 2 A non-integrated economy j does not grow at all, if its house-
holds are impatient enough for ρj ≥ (ε− 1)λjε1−β to hold.
Proof: Given (19), (25) and (26), economy j ∈ Γ saves (cj < 1) only if
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1 > ρj + [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λj. (27)
If condition (27) does not hold, then economy j ∈ Γ consumes all its income,
cj = 1. If this economy is left alone as a separate common market, Γ = {j}
and θ = 1, then, given (2), (4), (10) and (26), it does not save nor invest
in R&D, Sjι = zj = 0, consequently it does not grow at all, Λ = Λj = 0,
and λ = λj. Inequality (27) takes then the form (ε− 1)λjε1−β > ρj. Hence,
Λj = 0 for ρj ≥ (ε− 1)λjε1−β. 2
6 Economic integration
In Appendix B, we prove
Λ
(
Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
, lim
θ→∞
∂Λ
∂λj
> 0 for j ∈ Γ. (28)
where {ρk∈Γ} and {λk∈Γ} denote ρk and λk for all k ∈ Γ. Total consumption
in common market Γ is obtained by summing throughout all economies and
households in Γ, C
.
=
∫
j∈Γ
(∫ κj
ι1
Cjιdι
)
dj. In the stationary state, given (3),
(7), (19) and (28), we can define
C
B
= µ(θ(Γ))
∏
k∈Γ
x
1/θ(Γ)
k = µ(θ(Γ))
[
λ(Γ)− Λ(Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ})]∏
k∈Γ
λ
−1/θ(Γ)
k
.
= χ
(
Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
, lim
θ→∞
∂χ
∂λj
> 0 for j ∈ Γ. (29)
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Given (2), (9), (28) and (29), we obtain the welfare of the representative
household in common market Γ of size θ(Γ) as follows:
U = E
∫ ∞
T
1
1− βC
1−βe−ρ(τ−T )dτ = E
∫ ∞
T
1
1− βχ
1−βB1−βe−ρ(τ−T )dτ. (30)
The arrival rate of Poisson jumps in the level of consumption, B, is given
by (8). The social planner chooses the members of the common market
(i.e. the set Γ) among those who are willing to join in this to maximize
welfare (30) subject to the Poisson process. Denoting the value of the state
of technology t for the planner by Ψ
(
t, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
, the Bellman equation
for the planner’s optimization reads:11
ρΨ
(
t, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
= max
Γ
Φ
(
t,Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
, (31)
where, given (28) and (29),
Φ
(
t,Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
) .
= B(t)1−βχ
(
Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)1−β
/(1− β)
+ Λ
(
Γ, {ρk∈Γ}, {λk∈Γ}
)
[Ψ(t+ 1, ρ)−Ψ(t, ρ)],
lim
θ→∞
∂Φ
∂λj
> 0 for j ∈ Γ. (32)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that a common market expands by
taking new members economy by economy and that an economy can freely
leave the common market whenever it wants to do so. We can then prove:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, there can be a number of common markets
with different positive growth rates as well as a number of stagnating economies
which do not grow at all.
Proof: Let 1 be the economy which is most productive in R&D in the
whole world, λ1 = maxk λk, and Γ1 the frontier common market containing
economy 1. If economy 1 forms this common market alone, Γ1 = {1}, then
it prefers economy 2 as the second member, and these two together economy
3 as the third member, etc. Given (31), common market Γ1 expands, until
11We solve for the value function Ψ in Appendix C.
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any new member j would decrease welfare in Γ1 or any economy j would
decrease its welfare by joining in Γ1:
Φ
(
t,Γ1, {ρk∈Γ1}, {λk∈Γ1}
)
> Φ
(
t,Γ1 + {j}, {ρk∈Γ1}, ρj, {λk∈Γ1}, λj
)
or
Φ(t, {j}, ρj, λj) > Φ
(
t,Γ1 + {j}, {ρk∈Γ1}, ρj, {λk∈Γ1}, λj
)
for all j > θ1 = θ(Γ1) =
∫
Γ1
dk.
Let θ1 + 1 which is the most productive in R&D among those left outside
Γ1 and Γ2 the common market containing economy θ1 + 1. By the same
reasoning as above, we obtain the following equilibrium condition for Γ2:
Φ
(
t,Γ2, {ρk∈Γ2}, {λk∈Γ2}
)
> Φ
(
t,Γ2 + {j}, {ρk∈Γ2}, ρj, {λk∈Γ2}, λj
)
or
Φ(t, {j}, ρj, λj) > Φ
(
t,Γ2 + {j}, {ρk∈Γ2}, ρj, {λk∈Γ2}, λj
)
for all j > θ2 = θ(Γ2) =
∫
Γ2
dk.
Hence, by induction, we obtain a (finite) sequence {Γi} of common markets.
Outside sets {Γi}, there are only economies which do not grow at all. 2
The following corollary obtains:
Proposition 4 (Windows of opportunity) Consider economy j ∈ Θ which
has too weak saving incentives (i.e. with a high ρj) to grow if left alone. This
economy can grow if the productivity of its R&D, λj, is so high that it can
join a large common market with a positive growth rate.
Proof: Proposition 2 suggests that if ρj ≥ (ε − 1)λjε1−β, then economy j
does not grow at all. Assume that the productivity of R&D in economy j,
λj, is higher than mink∈Γ λk for any common market Γ of size θ(Γ). From
limθ→∞(∂Φ/∂λj) > 0 in (32) then follows that common market Γ takes
economy j as a member. Combining these two equalities, we obtain that
when common market Γ is large enough and the productivity of R&D in
economy j, λj, is within the range mink∈Γ λk < λj ≤ ρj/[(ε − 1)ε1−β], then
economy j does not grow at all if left alone, but starts growing if it joins
common market Γ. 2
Propositions 3 and 4 are interpreted in the final section.
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7 Conclusions
This paper examines a multi-economy world where growth is generated by
creative destruction as follows. Consumption is produced from intermediate
goods. A R&D firm creating the latest technology of an intermediate good
through a successful R&D project crowds the other firms with older technolo-
gies out of the market so that they lose their value. The firms finance their
R&D by selling shares, and households save only by buying these shares. Any
set of economies can form a common market in which intermediate goods are
freely traded and R&D firms can freely operate. We examine the effects of
the establishment and expansion of a common market on growth and social
welfare. The main findings can be summarized as follows.
Common markets that do moreR&D, produce more innovations and grow
faster. The expansion of a common market has two effects. New members
increase welfare through a wider variety of products. On the other hand,
if the new members have a lower productivity of R&D or a lower savings
rate than the old members of the common market, technological change
will be slower and the level of welfare lower for the old members. When
these advantages and disadvantages of economic integration are balanced,
the common market is of optimal size.
Economies integrate only if their productivity of R&D is more or less the
same. After integration they grow at the same rate, but at different levels of
productivity. The integration of two economies increases the growth rate of
the one whose R&D is less productive and decreases that of the other whose
R&D is more productive. If the productivity of R&D differs too much for
them, then the latter declines the integration. For it, the welfare loss of a
lower growth rate outweighs the welfare benefit of a wider variety of products.
Because economies with roughly the same productivity of R&D integrate,
there can be a number of common markets with different growth rates. Some
economies stagnate, because their incentives to save are too weak (e.g. house-
holds are too impatient) for R&D and growth. Such an economy can, how-
ever, escape from stagnation if it is productive enough in R&D to join in a
large common market with persistent growth. Because its R&D projects are
after integration financed by the savings of the other member economies, it
can then grow even without domestic saving.
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Appendix
A. The Behaviour of a Household
We denote variables depending on on technology tj by superscript tj.
Since, given (20), household ι’s income A
tj
jι depends on i
tj
jι, we note A
tj
jι(i
tj
jι).
On the assumption that cj is invariable across technologies, we obtain
P tjC
tj
jι = cjA
tj
jι(i
tj
jι), S
tj
jι = (1− cj)Atjjι(itjjι) = (1/cj − 1)P tjCtjjι . (33)
Household ι’s share in the next producer tj+1 is determined by its investment
under technology tj, i
tj+1
jι = I
tj
jι . Given (24), the value functions are
Ω(i
tj
jι, tj) =
(C
tj
jι )
1−β
(1− β)rj =
[cjA
tj
jι(i
tj
jι)/P
tj ]1−β
(1− β)rj ,
Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1) =
(C
tj+1
jι )
1−β
(1− β)rj =
[cjA
tj+1
jι (I
tj
jι )/P
tj+1]1−β
(1− β)rj . (34)
Given this and (20), we obtain
∂Ω(i
tj
jι, tj)/∂S
tj
jι = 0. (35)
From (4), (2), (12), (20) and (34) it follows that
∂I
tj
jι
∂S
tj
j
=
1
wtjΛ
tj
j
,
∂[A
tj+1
jι (I
tj
jι )]
∂I
tj
jι
=
∂[A
tj+1
jι (i
tj+1
jι )]
∂i
tj+1
jι
= 1− 1
ε
,
∂Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j
= (1− β)Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)
A
tj+1
jι
∂A
tj+1
jι
∂I
tj
j
∂I
tj
j
∂S
tj
j
=
(
1− 1
ε
)
(1− β)Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)
A
tj+1
jι w
tjΛ
tj
j
. (36)
We focus on a stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of labour
in (17) is invariable across technologies, z
tj
j = zj and x
tj
j = xj. Given
this, (4), (15), (20) and (33), wages, income, expenditure and the arrival
of innovations are also invariable across technologies, wtj = w, A
tj
jι = Ajι,
P tjC
tj
jι = P
tj+1C
tj+1
jι and Λ
tj
j = Λj. Because in a stationary state consump-
tion C
tj
jι and the level of productivity in the consumption-good sector, B
tj ,
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grow at the same rate, given (7) and (34), we obtain
P tj/P tj+1 = C
tj+1
jι /C
tj
jι = B
tj+1/Btj = [1/θ(Γ)]Bj(tj + 1)/Bj(tj) = ε/θ(Γ),
Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)/Ω(i
tj
jι, t) = (C
tj+1
jι /C
tj
jι )
1−β = ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1. (37)
Inserting these results, (33) and (34) into equation (22), we obtain
0 = (ρj + Λj)Ω(i
tj
jι, t)− (Ctjjι )1−β/(1− β)− ΛjΩ(I tjjι , tj + 1)
=
{
ρj − rj + [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λj
}
Ω(i
tj
jι, t).
This leads to (25).
Inserting (19), (25) and (33)-(37) into (23) and noting (15) produce
0 = Λj
[
∂Ω(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j
− ∂Ω(i
tj
j , t)
∂S
tj
j
]
− (C
tj
jι )
−β
P tj
= (1− 1/ε)(1− β)Ω(I tjjι , tj + 1)/(Ajιw)− (Ctjjι )−β/P tj
= (ε− 1)(λ− Λ)(1− β)Ω(I tjjι , tj + 1)/Ajι − (Ctjjι )−β/P tj
=
[
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)(1− β)P
tjΩ(I
tj
jι , tj + 1)
Ajι(C
tj
jι )
−β − 1
](Ctjjι )−β
P tj
=
[
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)(1− β)ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1P
tjΩ(i
tj
jι, t)
Ajι(C
tj
jι )
−β − 1
](Ctjjι )−β
P tj
=
[
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1P
tjC
tj
jι
Ajιrj
− 1
](Ctjjι )−β
P tj
=
[
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1 cj
rj
− 1
](Ctjjι )−β
P tj
=
{
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1cj
ρj + [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λj − 1
}
(C
tj
jι )
−β
P tj
.
This, (25) and cj < 1 yield (26), the expenditure-income ratio.
B. The function (28)
From this, (1), (2), (8), (10), (11), (19), (20), (26) it follows that
Λj =
1
w
∫
ι
Sjιdι = (1− cj)Aj/w = (1− cj)[λj + (1− 1/ε)/w]
= (1− cj)
{
λj + (ε− 1)[λ(Γ)− Λ]
}
for j ∈ Γ, (38)
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Λ
.
=
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
Λkdk =
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
(1− ck)[λk + (ε− 1)(λ− Λ)]dk
=
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
(1− ck)λkdk + (ε− 1)(λ− Λ)1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
(1− ck)dk
=
1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
λkdk − 1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
ckλkdk
+ (ε− 1)(λ− Λ)
(1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
dk − 1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
ckdk
)
= λ(Γ)− 1
θ(Γ)
∫
k∈Γ
ckλkdk + (ε− 1)[λ(Γ)− Λ]
(
1− 1
θ
∫
k∈Γ
ckdk
)
, (39)
(ε− 1)(λ− Λ)ε1−βθβ−1cj = ρj + (1− ε1−βθβ−1)Λj for j ∈ Γ. (40)
In the system (38)-(40), there are 2θ+1 equations, 2θ+1 endogenous variables
(Λj and cj for j ∈ Γ, and λ) and exogenous variables λk and ρk for j ∈ Γ.
This system defines the function χ in (28).
The expenditure-income ratio ck, the average productivity in R&D, λ,
and the arrival rate of innovations in the R&D process, Λ, are constrained
functions. Noting this and (2), differentiating (39) totally and letting θ to
be large enough, we obtain dΛ/dλj = dλ/dλj = 1/θ > 0.
C. The value function Ψ
We try the solution
Ψ(t, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ) = ψχ(Γ, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)1−βB(t)1−β/(1− β), (41)
where the variable ψ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system.
This and (6) yields
Ψ(t+ 1, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)/Ψ(t, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ) = [B(t+ 1)/B(t)]1−β = ε1−β > 0. (42)
Substituting (32), (41) and (42) into the Bellman equation (31), we obtain
0 = φ1−βB(t)1−β/(1− β) + [Ψ(t+ 1, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)−Ψ(t, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)]Λ
− ρΨ(t, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)
= Ψ(t, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)[1/ψ + (ε1−β − 1)Λ− ρ],
ψ = 1/[ρ+ (1− ε1−β)Λ].
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Inserting ψ back into (41) yields the value function
Ψ(t, ρk∈Γ)
= χ(Γ, ρk∈Γ, λk∈Γ)1−βB(t)1−β
/{
(1− β){ρ+ [1− ε1−βθ(Γ)β−1]Λ(Γ)}
}
.
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